Helping organisations protect themselves against trusted insiders
I attended the Security in Government (SIG) conference in Canberra earlier this month. I am somewhat biased, but I think that SIG is probably the best annual security related gathering in Australia.
If you compare it to a lot of international gatherings SIG certainly holds its own. Although, the US and German conferences in particular have glitz and size, the quality of the discussion and the more intimate nature is refreshing. SIG, as you may have guessed is primarily targeted at government, but there are good lessons for all organisations to be had there. Ok, enough of the fanboy …
The 2014 SIG theme was the ‘trusted insider’. Whilst the discussions were often very good, I wondered whether there are additional approaches to reducing the problem of the trusted insider. These approaches focus more on the relationship between employees and their organisations.
Who are the trusted insiders?
A trusted insider is somebody who uses their privileged access to cause harm to their employer or their interests. I’ll be a bit controversial here and note that, whether these people are traitors, spies or whistle-blowers depends somewhat on perspective. In any case these people evoke strong almost visceral emotions in many people.
Why are organisations so concerned about the trusted insider?
Despite fears about rogue hackers attacking organisations from the outside, the trusted insider is still considered the biggest threat to an organisation. In Australia and overseas, trusted insiders ‘going rogue’ have caused the significant damage to national security, government agencies and private organisations. The harm done can be from loss of secrets, money or even life.
Secrets: The most glaring examples in the information security space have probably come out of the USA in recent times. People like Edward Snowden and Chelsea (Bradley) Manning spring to mind in the national security sphere. However, some Swiss banks have also been stung by Bradley Birkenfield whom some in those establishments might call a trusted insider and the US tax agency would call a whistle-blower!
Money: Fraud is probably the most significant threat to private organisations from trusted insiders, particularly those in the finance and insurance industry. Sometimes the size of an event can be enormous, such as when $2billion was lost in 2011 through ‘unauthorised transactions’ in a Swiss bank.
Life and property: Whilst we often focus on loss of information confidentiality, trusted insiders were also responsible for assassinating the Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi in the 1980s and shooting fellow soldiers in the USA and Afghanistan in the last decade. There have also been a number of cases of ‘issue motivated’ insiders harming organisations by damaging plant and equipment.
What motivates the trusted insider? C.R.I.M.E.S.
The motivations of trusted insiders are varied, however they broadly fit under the standard drivers of criminal behaviour as described by the mnemonic ‘crimes’.
Coercion – being forced, blackmailed or intimated
Revenge – for a real or perceived wrong, it could be about disaffection and or a grudge
Ideology – radicalisation or advancement of an ideology /religious objective
Money – for cash, profit, dosh, moolah – whatever you call it, and/or
Exhilaration or Ego– for the excitement or because they think that they are in someway cleverer than their compatriots – Christopher Cook seemed driven by the excitement..
The USA’s “worst intelligence disaster” was Robert Hanssen, who might be described as an egomaniac.
Sex and personal relationships. The combination of sex and coercion is a lethal one.
Of course, some are also mentally fragile and may not have a motivation that is exactly clear to others.
End of part 1
In the coming part, we talk about some approaches to the trusted insider problem.
The best indicators of the future are the events of the past, yet the past is not an absolute indicator or future events. Outlier events are becoming more common and threatening the existence of organisations – Is enterprise risk management to be thrown out?
The vast majority of organisations that have ever existed are not around today. Of the top 25 companies on the US Fortune 500 in 1961, only six remained there in 2011.
The few that survive broadly did so for two reasons, which Alex Webling, Treasurer of the Australasian Council of Security Professionals will discuss with examples at ASIS Asia Pacific 2014 in Singapore.
I think we all understand that small businesses come and go, but this lesson is true for large organisations as well.Research carried out on fortune 500 companies in the USA showed that the average rate of turnover of large organisations is accelerating. The turnover has reduced from around 35 years in 1965 to around 15 years in 1995.
Alex has talked about this topic before and will be expanding on his observations and research with conference participants about how they might assist their organisational longevity.
Resilience for organisations is bound to their adaptability to climate change both in the short and long term.
A review of US public companies shows a number of climate related risks and costs. Their ability to adapt and become resilient to climate change is starting to affect their finances.
The document reveals that USA S&P 500 companies are seeing climate change related risks increase in urgency, likelihood and frequency, with many describing significant impacts already affecting their business operations, according to a new report from CDP, which collects environmental performance information on behalf of investors.
Threats include damage to facilities, reduced product demand, lost productivity and necessitated write-offs. The impact of these threats being realised comes with costs that can reach millions of dollars.
Importantly, the proximity of the threat is quite near. 45% of the risks S&P 500 companies face from extreme weather and climate changes are current, or expected to fall within the next one-to-five years, up from 26% just three years ago. 50% of these risks range from “more likely than not” to “virtually certain”. This is up from 34% three years ago.
Around 60 companies describe the current and potential future risks and their associated costs in the research, which highlights excerpts from the companies’ disclosures to their investors between 2011 and 2013. Ironically, even NewCorp made the following contribution to the report.
“Climate projection models make it difficult to know exactly how business might be impacted by episodic weather events. However, it is clear from past severe weather events that some of News Corporation’s businesses are susceptible to such extreme weather.”(p6)
The media release accompanying the report asserts that
Dealing with climate change is now a cost of doing business
Making investments in climate change related resilience planning both in their own operations and in the supply chain has become crucial for all corporations to manage this increasing risk.
Resilience Outcomes has the skills and expertise to help your organisation develop its organisational resilience strategy to take into account how it will adapt to the changing environment. contact us via the form below or at [email protected] to discuss your needs.
CDP is an international, not-for-profit organisation providing the only global system for companies and cities to measure, disclose, manage and share vital environmental information. We work with market forces to motivate companies to disclose their impacts on the environment and natural resources and take action to reduce them
The Australian Privacy Principles come into force on 12 March. The APPs extend coverage of privacy laws to most business with turnover of $3 million or more.
Fines of $1.7 million are possible for breaches.
Australian Privacy Principles
The Privacy Act now includes a set of 13 new harmonised privacy principles. The APPs regulate personal information handling by the federal government. In addition, the law significantly expands the number of private sector organisations covered.
The new Australian Privacy Principles (APPs) replace both the Information Privacy Principles (IPPs) that applied to Australian Government agencies and the National Privacy Principles (NPPs) that applied to some private sector organisations. The changes do not generally replace existing state of territory privacy legislation (eg Victoria & ACT) which will probably cause some confusion at the edges
A number of the APPs are quite different from the existing principles, including
APP 7 -on the use and disclosure of personal information for the purpose of direct marketing, and
APP 8 – on cross-border disclosure of personal information.
The OAIC gets teeth
The Privacy Act now includes greater powers for the OAIC which include:
conducting assessments of privacy compliance for both Australian Government agencies and some private sector organisations.
accepting enforceable undertakings
seeking civil penalties in the case of serious or repeated breaches of privacy
In some ways Australia is just catching up with Europe, Canada and USA, but its worth noting that breaches can mean organisations get fines of up to $1.7 million. It is probably an understatement to say that this could have a serious impact on company finances as well as reputations.
One thing that is very good about these changes is that there is better alignment with good information security practice. We hope that these changes may help some organisations improve the state of their information security as they become privacy compliant.
A new mandatory credit reporting privacy code (CR code), created by the Australian Retail Credit Association ( OAIC’s Codes Register ) also starts on 12 March 2014.
We can help
We are helping government agencies and businesses assess the privacy impact of their activities in light of these legal changes. In particular, we have recently worked with the health and finance sectors in Queensland, the ACT and Victoria.
Please contact us at Resilience Outcomes for assistance.
ENISA has released a good practice guide for CERTs that are tasked with protecting industrial control systems (SCADA).
The European Union Agency for Network and Information Security (ENISA) publishes a lot of advice and recommendations on good practice in information security. Necessarily, it has a European focus, but almost all the advice is applicable to systems in any region.
This SCADA CERT practice guide focuses on how Computer Emergency Response Teams should support Industrial Control Systems (ICS).The terms ‘ICS’ and ‘SCADA’ (Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition) are pretty much interchangeable.
SCADA systems were around before the Internet. The first systems were driven by mainframes and installed to control water and electricity networks. Since then, SCADA has become ubiquitous and systems that were initially designed to work on independent networks have been connected to the Internet.
Connecting SCADA to the Internet has many advantages. It increases system availability and reduces costs of connecting geographically disparate systems. At the same time, connecting SCADA to the Internet decreases system confidentiality and more importantly in this situation, system integrity.
The ENISA ICS guide tries to put together in one document, a guide for CERTs that are required to protect SCADA/ICS systems. Importantly, it doesn’t just focus on the technical capabilities required for operations, but also organisational capabilities and what it terms ‘co-operational capabilities’. This last part is important as computer emergency response teams can forget that they are part of a system and the system is only as strong as the weakest link. It is important to remember that preparation for things going wrong involves identifying people, resources and stakeholders that will be required. Developing relationships with other organisations will always pays dividends when an emergency occurs. This is where the ENISA advice is in some ways superior to the advice from the US DOE, although I acknowledge the attractive simplicity of some of their guidance.
It is good that the authors acknowledge that this area is one where there is limited experience and that the guide should be considered a ‘living document’. As usual in cyber-security protection, both technical expertise and organisational /management guidance are required.
News that the New York Times was hacked by the Syrian Electronic Army is interesting not because of the fact that NYT was hacked by the hacking group, but by the method of gaining access.
According to this article, information security at the NYT fell over because they forgot that cyber-security doesn’t stop at the perimeter. It would seem that MelbourneIT , an Australian hosting company for both Twitter and NYT was breached. This then allowed the Syrian Electronic Army to gain access to the DNS records of domains owned by Twitter and NYT which they then proceeded to change.
A number of quick conclusions
This was a well planned attack almost certainly took some time to conceive, research and operationalise.
You should assume your organisation will be hacked. Work out how to detect the breach and recover quickly.
Cyber-security is an evolutionary struggle between those who wish to break systems and those who wish to stop systems being broken. Quite often its the same people eg NSA
80-90% of the differences between good cyber-security and great cyber-security are not in the IT, they are in the organisational approach and culture.
In this hack, a variety of methods seem to have been used, including phishing and attacking the DNS servers via privilege escalation.
Cyber-security requires expertise in managing information, risk and developing resilient organisational frameworks, something often forgotten.
Everybody is your neighbour on the Internet, the good guys and the bad.
Cyber-security practitioners need to consider the risks to high-value systems that they are protecting from connected suppliers and customers.
This requires cyber-security practitioners who are good people influencers, because the vulnerabilities tend to be at human interfaces.
A biological approach to organisational resilience
By a lapsed microbiologist
“Organisational resilience is only achievable through adaptability”
Too many leaders start believing their own press and thinking that they are able to predict the future. Whilst it is absolutely true that the best indicators of the future are the events of the past. It is also true that the past is not an absolute indicator of future events because our view of the past is limited by our record of it. Some events are so rare that they are not recorded, yet they may have extreme consequences if they occur. So if we cannot predict the future with certainty, how is longevity possible for organisations? The answer is resilience, and at the core of resilience is adaptability.
The lesson from biology is that adaptation to the environment that has allowed organisms to survive and thrive. However large and seemingly terrible an organism is, if it is not adapted to its environment it will become extinct. The vast majority of species that have ever existed are not around today.
The same is true for organisations.
The vast majority of organisations that have ever existed are not around today
In simple terms the story is the same for each failed organisation. They were unable to adapt to the business environment before they ran out of resources. Those that survive a crisis are able to do so for two reasons
1 They have the resources, capital personnel leadership etc to manage themselves out of a crisis once it hits emerging weaker but alive; or
2 They are prepared to adapt if a crisis arises and have developed a broad set of principles which will work with minimal change in most eventualities. These companies still suffer from the crisis at first, but emerge stronger in the longer term.
By my reckoning, 99% of companies that manage to survive a crisis are in the first category. In most cases, those companies are then consigned to a slow death (My Space anyone?). Sometimes however, the first crisis weakens them, but they then become more resilient and bounce back to ride future crises.
This is an era of organisational accelerated extinction
What is more, the ‘extinction rate’ for companies is becoming faster as society and technology changes more rapidly.
I think we all understand that small businesses come and go, but this lesson is true for large organisations as well. Of the top 25 companies on the US Fortune 500 in 1961, only six remained there in 2011.
Research carried out on fortune 500 companies in the USA shows that the average rate of turnover of large organisations is accelerating. The turnover has reduced from around 35 years in 1965 to around 15 years in 1995.
If you think about how much the world has changed since 1995 when Facebook barely existed and Google just did search, you might agree with the idea that organisations that want to stick around need to adapt with the changing environment.
So give me the recipe!
Bad news, there isn’t a hard recipe for a resilient organisation, just like there isn’t one for a successful company, but they all seem to share some common attributes such as agility and the ability to recover quickly from an event and an awareness of their changing environment and the willingness to evolve with it amongst others. This is difficult for a number of reasons.
1 increasing connectedness – interdependencies leading to increasing brittleness of society/organisations – just in time process management – risks, in rare instances, may become highly correlated even if they have shown independence in the past
2 increasing speed of communication forces speedier decision making
3 increasing complexity compounds the effect of any variability in data and therefore the uncertainty for decision makers
4 biology – Organisations operate with an optimism bias. Almost all humans are more optimistic about their future than statistically possible. We plan for a future which is better than it is and do not recognise the chances of outlier events correct. Additionally, we plan using (somewhat biased) rational thought, but respond to crises with our emotions.
5 Organisational Inertia. The willingness to change organisational culture to adapt to a change in the environment.
Something about organisational culture and resilience
When discussing culture, resilience is more an organisational strategic management strategy, and less a security protocol. In this sense, Resilience is the ‘why’ to Change Management’s ‘how’. But both are focused on organisational culture.
Organisations, particularly large organisations, all have their own way of doing things. Organisational culture is built up because individuals within the organisation find reward in undertaking tasks in a certain way. This is the same whether we are talking about security culture or indeed financial practice. Organisational culture goes bad when the reward structure in the organisation encourages people to do things that are immoral or illegal.
Larger organisations have more inertia and so take longer to move from good to bad culture and vice versa. Generally most organisations that are larger than about 150 staff have a mix of cultures.
The more successful an organisation has been in the past, the more difficult (inertia) it will be to make change and so it becomes susceptible to abrupt failure. Miller coined the term ‘Icarus Paradox‘ to describe the effect and wrote a book by the same name. Icarus was the fictional Greek character who with his son made wings made from feathers and wax, but died when he flew too close to the sun and the wax melted, causing the feathers to fall out of the wings.
Maybe the Kodak company is the best example of this. An organisation that had been very successful for more than 100 years (1880 -2007), Kodak failed to make the transition to digital and to transition from film as fast as its competitors. The irony is that it was Kodak researchers who in the 1970s invented the first digital camera thus sewing the seeds for the company’s doom forty years later.
Where does my organisation start on the path
So what is the answer, how do we make sure that our organisations adapt faster than the environment that is changing more rapidly every time we look around? The only way is to begin to adapt to the changing environment before crises arise. This requires making decisions with less than 100% certainty and taking risk. The alternative is to attempt to change after a crisis arises, which historically carries higher risk for organisations.
It is a combination of many things –
developing an organisational culture which recognises these attributes which is supported and facilitated from the top of the organisation;
partnering with other organisations to increase their knowledge and reach when an event comes; and
Lastly engaging in the debate and learning about best practices
Are there two sorts of resilience?
But is resilience just one set of behaviours or a number. When we think of resilient organisations and communities, our minds tend to go to the brave community / people / organisation that rose up after a high consequence event and overcame adversity. These people and organisations persist in the face of natural and manmade threats. Numerous examples include New York after the September 2001 events; Brisbane after the floods in 2011; and the Asian Tsunami in 2004.
However there is another set of actions, which are more difficult in many ways to achieve. This is the capacity to mitigate the high consequence, low likelihood events or the creeping disaster before a crisis is experienced. The US behaved admirably in responding to the 9/11 terrorist disaster after it had occurred, but as the 9/11 Commission Report notes, terrorists had attempted on numerous occasions to bring down the World Trade Center and come quite close to succeeding.
Life becomes resilient in that it is replicated wildly so that many copies exist, so that if some number fail, life can continue. Individual creatures carry DNA, which is all that needs to be replicated. Those creatures compete with each other and the environment to become more and more efficient. An individual creature may or may not be resilient, but the DNA is almost immortal.
How an organisation achieves this is the challenge that every management team needs to address if they want to achieve longevity.
If you wish to discuss any of the issues in this whitepaper, please contact us
 noting that the word dinosaur is directly translated as terrible lizard
A culture of entitlement is corrosive in a government agency or any organisation
I’ve just come across a USA government document which is both fun to read and educational. Its called the Encyclopedia of ethical failure 2013, its published by the US Defense department. The dry title doesn’t do this piece justice, I think the title should be “A culture of entitlement in an organisation is corrosive”.
The reason that you should be reading it is that it is a series of sometimes funny and tragic stories about how employees forget that the employee/employer relationship is a two-way street. Maybe it is also about how employers forget that their staff are human. They sometimes do dumb things and forget about the consequences of their actions.
Steven Dubner from Freakanomics interviewed the current and past editors Steve Epstein and Jeff Green. Interestingly they said that it was difficult to find common characteristics (M/F, race, religiosity, seniority) between the people who did these things. Green and Epstein suggested that they all didn’t think about the consequences of their actions properly. The other thing to notice is that security people, intelligence officers and lawyers commit these crimes too.
Maybe as a collection these are cases of a man or woman failing to identify the full consequences of their actions. I could put it in risk terms, individual failure to realise initial risk and downstream consequences when the they get caught.
The other observation that is interesting is that some people are cheap to bribe. Some of these people lost their careers and potential earnings of millions of dollars over a lifetime for hundreds of dollars in cash or kind. This is an sign that the perpetrators haven’t thought about personal risk and/or their decision-making is visceral. It makes me wonder whether one possible mitigation against fraud is teaching employees decision-making to improve the way that they weigh up alternatives. Maybe the SWOT analysis is the best preventative tool against fraud!
Because the document was written by the US Defense department, it has a military flavour, but the examples run the gamut of the US Federal public service. Here are some of my favourite excerpts. I’m sure you’ll get a laugh out of these and some food for thought. Maybe some of these are familiar in your organisation…..
FBI Undercover Parties
According to an FBI report, upon the retirement of a senior FBI official, FBI personnel from around the country journeyed to Washington to attend the official’s retirement party. Many out-of-town G-men traveled on official orders and public expense. According to their travel orders, the purpose of the trip was to attend an ethics conference! According to the news report, only five people actually attended the ethics forum.
“But, Judge, I didn’t get anything!”
An offshore safety inspector found much of the Government’s equipment to be in need of repairs to meet safety standards. He then referred the business to his brother-in-law’s repair shop. The rig operators smelled a rat and called the FBI. They discovered that, in return for each referral, the brother-in-law was treating the inspector to an evening with a lady of dubious morals.
The case was brought to trial. In his defense, the inspector claimed that he had not received a “thing of value” in return for the referral. The judge didn’t buy it – and neither did his wife.
A former official of the U.S. Tax Court, Fred Fernando Timbol Jr., was sentenced to 18 months in prison and three years of supervised release in connection with a bribery conspiracy.
Timbol was a facilities services officer in the Facilities Management Section of the U.S. Tax Court. Timbol was responsible for assisting in the award of contracts to contractors who provided maintenance, construction, and other related service to the Court. Timbol admitted to soliciting and accepting over $12,000 from a government contractor in exchange for rigging the award of at least six inflated contracts. As part of a plea agreement and by order of the court, Timbol also agreed to pay restitution of $24,143.
DVD Bootleggers MIA During Government Work Hours
A Federal employee used his Government computer to make illegal copies of commercial DVDs in violation of copyright laws. He and another employee also used their Government computers and duty time to watch the movies. The other employee took lunches lasting up to three hours in order to watch the DVDs and take naps. Initially the employees’ supervisors signed off on this behavior, even assigning extra work to others to make up for the employees’ time wasted napping and movie watching. The employee who copied the DVDs received a written reprimand. The supervisor received an oral admonishment for failing to address the misconduct, and another employee received a Letter of Counseling for knowingly accepting a pirated DVD. In a similar case, a civilian employee working for the U.S. Army in Germany was involved in selling pirated DVDs. He used the profits from his illegal operation to buy vacation homes and luxury cars and to pay for frequent European ski vacations. He devoted some of his duty time to the marketing and selling of the bootleg videos, including taking payments while on the job. Even though the employee had left Federal service by the time the accusations against him were substantiated, administrative action was taken to bar him from US Army Europe installations.
This next one is interesting because of the recent Asiana crash
FAA Employee Sentenced for Bribery
A former employee of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) was convicted of bribery. In carrying out his primary responsibility of reviewing and processing applications for FAA-issued pilot certificates, the employee accepted bribes of $2,000 and an all-expense paid trip to Korea in exchange for preferential treatment of applications for Korean pilots from the flight school, Wings Over America.
The employee was sentenced to pay a $2,000 fine and serve four months in prison, followed by three years probation for violating 18 U.S.C. 201(b)(2). Bribery occurs when a public official seeks or accepts anything of value in return for being influenced in the performance of an official act.
government Lawyer in Tucson Illegally Possesses Sheep Skull and Horns
The Assistant U.S. Attorney (AUSA) prosecuted an individual for illegally killing a bighorn sheep on an Indian Reservation. As a result of the prosecution, the hunter forfeited the bighorn sheep and trophy (skull and horns), valued at approximately $5,000, to the Arizona Game and Fish Department. Pursuant to a request from the AUSA, the Arizona Game and Fish Department entered into an agreement with the AUSA allowing him to publicly display the skull and horns in his office, but requiring their return upon request. However, after leaving employment with the U.S. Attorney’s office, the AUSA took the skull and horns with him and treated them as his personal property. When the former AUSA was questioned a year later about his possession of the skull and horns, he claimed that an unspecified Indian had sent the skull and horns to him in appreciation for his work on the prosecution of the hunter. Investigation showed that such a gift would have been contrary to tribal practices and no member of the tribe could be found who knew anything about the alleged gift.
CIA Employee Drives Overseas Auto Scheme
As a U.S. Federal employee residing in Egypt, the CIA agent discovered that he could purchase an imported vehicle in Egypt without having to pay the normal 150% excise tax. This fact had created a black market in which Egyptian car brokers would pay U.S. employees to register luxury cars in their names in order to allow the dealers to evade import taxes. Investigators found that while in Cairo, Egypt, the employee had agreed to accept $25,000 in exchange for changing the status of his personally-owned vehicle with the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which would allow him to participate in the scheme
So there’s some of the highlights from my perspective. You can download the full document here (163 pages). You’ll find that it references most vices! What do you think about the alternative title – “A culture of entitlement in an organisation is corrosive”?
Making strategic decisions about cyber security, or any sort of security needs to be done a the board level. It is difficult to get company boards to focus on strategic issues, despite the fact that this is what they are theoretically meant to do. Companies are busy places and there are always minute issues that take time from board meetings. In some companies, the culture is such that managers avoid their responsibility by sending decisions to the board, again robbing the board of valuable time.
The Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure, a UK Government organisation, has released a short document aimed at helping security managers get cyber security onto the corporate agenda. CPNI makes the somewhat obvious point that getting buy-in from a company board is crucial to the successful outcome of a cyber security implementation project.
Although the CPNI paper doesn’t spell it out quite this way, the key is to show in a concise manner why security is of importance to them and the company they are responsible for. Generally the key issues fall into three categories.
Financial – the loss due to another entity (government, business, criminal) gaining commercially sensitive information. The effect of this can be short term where a negotiation is damaged or longer term where valuable intellectual property is lost.
Legal – many organisations are subject to regulatory requirements to protect information that they hold on behalf of clients, stakeholders and staff. In Australia, the Australian Privacy Principles come into force in March 2014. Most private sector organisations will be required to adhere to them. Financial and professional organisations have been required to meet similar requirements for a number of years.
Reputational – High profile privacy breaches have affected a number of large companies. Companies such as Sony, Heartland and RSA have suffered huge breaches which cost them millions of dollars to clean up and resulted in significant lost business. In some cases, they have resulted in tightened regulation which in turn increased the cost of doing business.
Things to remember
most if not all board members will not have a good understanding of the Internet or information security (Tech companies are the exception of course).
boards are generally made up of people who are very clever and need you to acknowledge it – presentations need to be logical but also require little subject specific knowledge.
If you are the expert, you need to have the answer when one board member starts talking about “his daughter’s computer” or the spam she “gets on the company email” that she doesn’t get at home – this is where a well briefed chair is important
the best briefings work when board members are given details of current, real world examples of similar companies’ misfortunes. You can bet that Microsoft looked very hard at the Sony hack at the board level and that CA examined the breach of RSA tokens carefully!
Sometimes an outside expert needs to be brought in to tell the board what the security cell already knows. It is a funny quirk of human nature that we sometimes don’t give enough respect to the people in our own organisation.
That’s where you can call on us to help you get your message across. We have experience talking to boards and senior executives from government, councils, banks and companies including those in the DISP.