Security Professionalisation in Australasia

Security Professionalisation in Australasia

Security Professionalisation is an issue that all who are involved or care about societal resilience should be concerned about. I’ve just written an article for Security Solutions Magazine talking about the efforts that a new organisation, Security Professionals Australasia (SPA) is undertaking to work with the security industry and governments to improve the state of affairs.

The article has been published in the latest edition of Security Solutions Magazine (Nov/Dc 2015) which is available at  http://www.securitysolutionsmagazine.biz/ 

(Disclosure of interest, Alex Webling is a member of SPA)

Good cybersecurity is repetitive and boring

The loss of 4 million records reminds agencies that good Cybersecurity is repetitive and boring

The US Government announced on 4 June that the private information of at least four million current and former government workers had been compromised.

The intrusion occurred in systems owned by the US Office of Personnel Management (OPM) which handles government security clearances. It was detected in April 2015, but in line with most other such intrusions, may have started in 2014.

The attack drew calls by politicians for legislation to strengthen the USA’s cyberdefences. The US blamed China for the breaches, though it is unclear how good their attribution information is.

The Boring but tremendously important bits

Reports from the New York Times indicated that OPM did not possess an inventory of all the computer servers and devices with access to its networks, and did not require anyone gaining access to information from the outside multifactor authentication. OPM also did not regularly scan for vulnerabilities in the system, and found that one third of computer systems that were supposed to be certified as safe for use last year were not “operating with a valid authorization.”

Let’s be clear here, the answer for Cybersecurity in organisations is good housekeeping!

  • Assess the business impact levels for your systems
  • Patch
  • Authenticate
  • Minimise privileges
  • Scan your logs
  • REPEAT

There are more things like application whitelisting, but get those right and your organisation can do better than the US Government. The Australian Signals Directorate has published a number of guides for government agencies to help them mitigate all but the most targeted intrusions. They are worth checking out.  http://www.asd.gov.au/publications/protect/top_4_mitigations.htm

This Koala is completely secure from cyber attack
This Koala is completely secure from cyber attack

The answer is not more power for intelligence and law enforcement

Let’s keep it simple

  • Assess the business impact levels for your systems
  • Patch
  • Authenticate
  • Minimise privileges
  • Scan your logs
  • REPEAT

If you have to call the guys/girls in dark suits from government agencies, you’ve lost the fight. Just like in the real world, if you have to call the cops, something’s really wrong with your security.

Attribution is so so hard in the cyber, you have to be very lucky and have deep pockets to go after the crims.

Better to build your fence higher than those around you, but encourage your partners to build their fences higher too, because security is only as good as the weakest link.

Where might government focus its resources?

Rather than spending money on dealing with hacked systems after they happen. Government would be far better off providing good advice, encouraging education of cyber professionals and encouraging software and hardware developers to manufacture secure code and systems.

Mandatory Disclosure

Some commentators are complaining about how long it took the US to disclose the breach. At least the US has fessed up. In Australia, where there are no mandatory disclosure rules, it seems unlikely that a government agency would admit to this, despite the obvious importance of this to the victims who lost their personal data.

I repeat my call for mandatory data breach notification for all public and private organisations in all OECD countries.

Data centralisation

Many Australian state and territory governments have created shared services functions for their ICT and human resources functions. The issue is that if the wrong people get access as they did in the US OPM, then they potentially have access to everything.

Much has been made of the potential savings available to governments from centralising their data functions. Whilst this may be the case in the short term, like outsourcing, the return on investment over the long term is very much unproven. Shared services ICT functions aggregate data and create honeypots for organised criminals and national espionage groups. It is true that with shared services, ICT functions are able to afford more staff, the question is whether this advantage truly outweighs the dependencies on data that are created and the increased attractiveness of the target.

It is a question as to whether decreasing the value of a system by decreasing its attractiveness ie by decentralising, can be used to affect business impact levels. However it certainly makes intuitive sense, in that you should be able to maintain the relative risk of a system by splitting it into multiple separate systems whilst giving the organisation its operating requirements in terms of integrity of system and availability – see everybody’s happy!

When I was running Protective Security Policy, my team and I tried to address this with policies about aggregation of data and Business Impact Levels. Business impact levels are an excellent way of approaching agency cybersecurity on a holistic and strategic basis. The reason is that they take into account not only the confidentiality of information, but also its availability and accessibility. This allows the whole organisation to have a discussion about what they are willing to live with.

Human Resources information like that compromised in the OPM hack becomes useless if the right people can’t access it easily and keep it up to date. In the case of OPM, the organisation faces a significant problem in trying to do its job in managing clearances, which requires the information to have good availability against the traditional security argument, to lock things down.

Organisations need to fulfil their function, the confidentiality of information is always secondary to the primary mission in the minds of the executive.

Agency security advisers often find that they lose arguments on the basis of $$$, particularly in these times of shrinking government budget.

The way to make the argument is to do so on the basis not of security, but finance.

Accountants understand risk, they just talk about it differently. Any CISO worth their salt needs to talk in terms of value, efficiency and reputation for the organisation they represent. Otherwise, they might as well be talking Cantonese to a Mandarin speaker.

Here’s a collection of links, which might be useful

http://www.npr.org/2015/06/05/412177006/opm-hack-exposes-records-of-4-million-federal-employees

http://www.politico.com

http://www.engadget.com/2015/06/06/opm-hack-details-revealed/

https://threatpost.com/opm-hack-may-have-exposed-security-clearance-data/113184

http://www.govexec.com/technology/2015/06/massive-data-breach-puts-spotlight-shared-it-services/114613/?oref=ng-channelriver

http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/jun/05/us-government-opm-hack-data-collection-powers

http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/chinese-hackers-breach-federal-governments-personnel-office/2015/06/04/889c0e52-0af7-11e5-95fd-d580f1c5d44e_story.html

Help

We can help your agency set up its cybersecurity defence policies and procedures.

Contact us at [email protected] to talk to a cybersecurity policy expert.

The state of ICT Security

State of ICT Security – Attackers take over SCADA controlled steelworks furnace and caused massive damage

The threat to online assets from attackers remains critical according to a report just released on the State of ICT security by the German Government.

Cloud Computing, mobile systems and big data are providing enormous economic prosperity, but have on the other hand opened up large attack surface for organisations.

The German Federal Department for Safety in Information Technology  has just released its annual “State of ICT Security” report for 2014. The German Government’s version of the bit of NSA that helps government and businesses protect themselves online is called the BSI. They are highly skilled and well respected.

As is usual for a government report it is turgid. However there is some really interesting stuff hidden in the morass.  I’ve picked out some of the gems and translated them here.

Complexity is killing information security

The report emphasises that complexity is exposing organisations to attack. Of particular concern is that Internet of Things (Systeme und Dinge) is now moving from the stage where it is mostly about observation of the environment to changing the environment.

Importantly, particularly in light of the Snowden expose, this report is not coming from either the US or UK and so gives a secondary source to some of what those governments are saying.

There are over 250 million individual varieties of Windows malware around now

Other observations which confirm what you may have seen in other places

  1. Spam continues to grow exponentially
  2. Malware is still growing and at least a million devices are being infected annually in Germany. The BSI estimates that the number of different types of Windows malware is at a staggering 250 million. This is up from around 180 million in 2013!
  3. The number of infected sites delivering ‘driveby exploits’ is growing substantially.
  4. Botnets are being used to steal identity information. There are more than one million devices under the control of botnets in Germany.
  5. Phishing continues to yield results for cyber criminals

Advanced Persistent Threats – an increasing threat for government and industry

Germany is constantly being cyber-attacked by foreign intelligence services. The BSI has installed improved sensor technology in the government’s networks following the revelations that came from Edward Snowden in 2013/14. There are a number of methodologies which the BSI has identified. This tallies quite well with some of the things Bruce Schneier has written recently about these issues

  • Strategic enlightenment – whereby the intelligence service identifies connections between various users to gain an intelligence picture
  • Attacks on key individuals – attacking system administrators for key systems to gain access.
  • Influencing Standards – By weakening standards, , the allegation has been that NSA individuals have influenced the NIST standards development process.
  • Manipulation of IT hardware and software – Well they would do that wouldn’t they.

The BSI notes that trusted insiders are being used to enable some attacks by intelligence services, criminals and activists.

This table is reasonably easy to read, even if you don’t understand German. It shows the prognosis (prognose) for threats over the coming year.

Schwachstellen = vulnerabilities
Schadprogramme = malware
Identitaetsdiebstahl = ID theft

Cyber threat prognosis

Casestudies

The report goes through a number of cases where the BSI was called to assist businesses. Here are two that are of particular concern.

Steelworks compromise causes massive damage to furnace.

One of the most concerning was a targeted APT attack on a German steelworks which ended in the attackers gaining access to the business systems and through them to the production network (including SCADA). The effect was that the attackers gained control of a steel furnace and this caused massive damages to the plant.

Dragonfly attacks a dozen companies

The Dragonfly hacker group attacked a number of companies’ SCADA systems and installed the malware ‘Havex’. This was used to gather information about the systems. No damage was done, because the compromise was detected and removed before the hackers had completed the observation and intelligence gathering phase.

Conclusion

It’s worth remembering that there are many other countries dealing with the cyber threat around the world. Germany has always been one of the leading non-UK CAN, US, AUS, NZ countries and it is interesting to see how they view the landscape.

You can download the original Document from the BSI – Bundesamt fuer Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik – in German “Die Lage der IT-Sicherheit in Deutschland 2014”  https://www.bsi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/BSI/Publikationen/Lageberichte/Lagebericht2014.pdf?__blob=publicationFile

Trusted Insider cont.

Trusted Insider continued

Part 2 of 2 talking about the trusted Insider and how organisations can address the problems at an organisational level

In part 1 of this we talked about who are the trusted insiders, why organisations are concerned and what the motivations of the trusted insider are. Part1 is here – https://www.resilienceoutcomes.com/identity/trusted-insider/

In this part, we talk about some approaches to the trusted insider problem.

Organisations are asking “How can we stop employees becoming the next Edward Snowden?”

I think we should question is why aren’t there more people like Edward Snowden? I think it is worth noting that the NSA is huge with an unconfirmed staff count in the order of 30,000-40,000. One or even ten ‘rogue insiders’ is as a percentage very small – even though the damage to the USA and its allies has been very significant.

Organisations, including intelligence organisations, develop very rigorous and reliable procedures to ensure that people who shouldn’t be trusted don’t join their organisations. Good recruitment practices which exclude people who won’t fit and don’t let people become insiders in the first place are the best defence. However, one of the hardest issues to manage is to deal with people who gradually become disgruntled after they’ve been working in an organisation for a while.

Of course, organisations can use infosec procedures such as internal surveillance mechanisms and information compartmentalisation. These can reduce the consequences wrought by trusted insiders. However these mechanisms can inhibit the rest of the employee body from working at their full potential. It also can affect staff morale if not carefully marketed. Interestingly SIG attendees were told that the Attorney-General’s Department was considering the possibility of a continuous disclosure regime for security clearances which would in real or near real time provide information to security officials about whether employees were undertaking activities which might raise eyebrows.

A Sharing economy model?

Considering an organisational ‘sharing economy’ model when considering the trusted insider threat might help. The employee/employer relationship is one of mutual benefit. It can be also one of mutual harm.

http://pixabay.com/

Employees work for their organisation and their identity becomes entwined in the reputation and identity of that organisation. As mentioned previously, the trusted insider that does the wrong thing by their organisation does so for a number of reasons. The most dangerous reason has always been those who are motivated not by money or greed, but by a grievance or revenge.

If we extrapolate using the NSA/Snowden example…. The NSA has built up an impressive reputation over many years for technical excellence. But maybe some of its employees believed the propaganda of their employer. More importantly, it would seem that NSA’s management failed to completely disabuse their employees of the fact that intelligence agencies live in a grey world and do things that are morally grey. Consequently people working inside the NSA seem to have been surprised when they found that some of the things it was doing were dark. Unfortunately for the NSA, brilliant people became disillusioned and turned against it.

This explanation is probably not the whole answer. However a couple of thoughts arise both of which may help to prevent future events:

  • is it possible to develop an internal organisational market for the reputation of the organisation?
  • A meaningful alternative chain of reporting to vent frustrations is vital.

A market of organisational reputation

Many private and public organisations organisations spend significant sums to monitor their public relations posture. There is benefit in understanding what the organisation thinks about itself as well.  An anonymous reporting mechanism can allow an organisation to get some information about whether it is ‘on the nose’. Such data might also be combined with metrics such as the number of relevant social media postings.

http://pixabay.com/

An alternative chain of reporting

Both USA and Australia now have whistle-blower mechanisms for their intelligence services. In Australia, the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security performs this role.

Many organisations both in the private and public sector could consider the benefits of taking on aspects of this system. It obviously doesn’t work perfectly, but it certainly contributes to the protection of the intelligence agencies from trusted insiders.

Mr Snowden has claimed that “he had raised alarms at multiple levels about the NSA’s broad collection of phone, email and Internet connections.” However, this is disputed by the USA. Whatever the truth of the matter, it seems that Snowden felt he wasn’t being listened to. So maybe the take-home from this aspect is that the ‘alternate chain’ of reporting needs to have big teeth to make changes where there are real problems identified. Balancing natural justice against the consequences of a breach is incredibly important. Not only for the individual concerned, but for the organisation itself, because you know people in organisations gossip about each other!

http://pixabay.com/

This is of course a governance issue, and this makes it very tricky to get right – this is where Resilience Outcomes Australia can help your organisation, because resilience and longevity of organisations is what we do.

Further reading:

Managing the insider threat to your business – a personnel security handbook (PDF) from the Australian Attorney-General’s Department is a good place to start.

Australian IGIS – Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security – the reports are worth having a look at.

USA Department of Defense Whistleblower Program is part of the Office of the Inspector General of the US Department of Defense. One of the sub-programmes it runs is specifically for the US Intelligence Community.

http://pixabay.com/

The trusted insider

The trusted insider.

Helping organisations protect themselves against trusted insiders

I attended the Security in Government (SIG) conference in Canberra earlier this month. I am somewhat biased, but I think that SIG is probably the best annual security related gathering in Australia.

If you compare it to a lot of international gatherings SIG certainly holds its own. Although, the US and German conferences in particular have glitz and size, the quality of the discussion and the more intimate nature is refreshing. SIG, as you may have guessed is primarily targeted at government, but there are good lessons for all organisations to be had there. Ok, enough of the fanboy …

The 2014 SIG theme was the ‘trusted insider’. Whilst the discussions were often very good, I wondered whether there are additional approaches to reducing the problem of the trusted insider. These approaches focus more on the relationship between employees and their organisations.

http://pixabay.com/

Who are the trusted insiders?

A trusted insider is somebody who uses their privileged access to cause harm to their employer or their interests. I’ll be a bit controversial here and note that, whether these people are traitors, spies or whistle-blowers depends somewhat on perspective. In any case these people evoke strong almost visceral emotions in many people.

Why are organisations so concerned about the trusted insider?

Despite fears about rogue hackers attacking organisations from the outside, the trusted insider is still considered the biggest threat to an organisation. In Australia and overseas, trusted insiders ‘going rogue’ have caused the significant damage to national security, government agencies and private organisations. The harm done can be from loss of secrets, money or even life.

Secrets: The most glaring examples in the information security space have probably come out of the USA in recent times. People like Edward Snowden and Chelsea (Bradley) Manning spring to mind in the national security sphere. However, some Swiss banks have also been stung by Bradley Birkenfield whom some in those establishments might call a trusted insider and the US tax agency would call a whistle-blower!

http://pixabay.com/

Money: Fraud is probably the most significant threat to private organisations from trusted insiders, particularly those in the finance and insurance industry. Sometimes the size of an event can be enormous, such as when $2billion was lost in 2011 through ‘unauthorised transactions’ in a Swiss bank.

http://pixabay.com/

Life and property: Whilst we often focus on loss of information confidentiality, trusted insiders were also responsible for assassinating the Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi in the 1980s and shooting fellow soldiers in the USA and Afghanistan in the last decade. There have also been a number of cases of ‘issue motivated’ insiders harming organisations by damaging plant and equipment.

http://pixabay.com/

What motivates the trusted insider?  C.R.I.M.E.S.

The motivations of trusted insiders are varied, however they broadly fit under the standard drivers of criminal behaviour as described by the mnemonic ‘crimes’.

Coercion – being forced, blackmailed or intimated

Revenge – for a real or perceived wrong, it could be about disaffection and or a grudge

Ideology – radicalisation or advancement of an ideology /religious objective

Money – for cash, profit, dosh, moolah – whatever you call it, and/or

Exhilaration or Ego– for the excitement or because they think that they are in someway cleverer than their compatriots –  Christopher Cook seemed driven by the excitement..
The USA’s “worst intelligence disaster” was Robert Hanssen, who might be described as an egomaniac.

Sex and personal relationships. The combination of sex and coercion is a lethal one.

Of course, some are also mentally fragile and may not have a motivation that is exactly clear to others.

End of part 1

In the coming part, we talk about some approaches to the trusted insider problem.

Over-classification restricts information sharing

Over-classification in government continues to restrict information sharing according to a report by the US Department of Defense Inspector General.

Balance in Information Security

I’ve written previously about over-classification and why it needs to be actively countered in large organisations in the private sector and more importantly government. Getting the balance right in information security is critical to mission success.

There are a few key findings from the Inspector General’s report which will be no surprise for anybody who’s worked in a classified environment. The review sampled emails and documents classified by the US Defense Department and found:

  • 100% of the emails reviewed were incorrectly classified or marked
  • Around 70% of the sample material (documents/ files)  had ‘classification discrepancies’

I’d like to say its better in Australia, but I’m not confident. What is more interesting from a security perspective is the over-classification of material. The report states

“we do not believe that those instances concealed violations of law, inefficiency, or administrative error; prevented embarrassment to a person, organization, or agency; restrained competition; or prevented or delayed the release of information not requiring protection in the interest of national security.”

Well they would say that wouldn’t they. But leaving my cynic’s hat off for the moment… Ok one passing comment – there is a difference between the organisational approach which tries not to conceal and the approach of individuals or groups within an organisation.

Unfortunately, the report doesn’t make very many recommendations that will bring about change. In typical public servant speak, it says

We recommend that the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics carry out the recommendations outlined in this report and continue to leverage the new Defense Security Enterprise, especially with regard to ensuring that Original Classification Authorities are fully engaged and accountable.

In any case, the report does acknowledge that

over-classification could unnecessarily restrict information sharing.

Hooray! Admittedly, a bit softer than I would like, but still important.

In this information age where as the Snowden revelations keep showing us,  the US and allies have access to huge swathes of information, but they can’t use it effectively to defend themselves or their allies.

The answer to this problem is not gathering more information! The 9/11 Report and scores of others keep telling us that we have the information in our databases, but we don’t use it effectively.

I’m not sure what the best analogy is here, maybe its a person who’s brain is not connected to their muscles properly. They can see and hear everything, but they rarely succeed in reacting to any of these stimuli. The problem with this analogy is that somebody with locked in syndrome desperately wants to make his limbs move. I’m not  sure this is the case with intelligence agencies and sharing information.

This does seem to be the curse of too much information and not enough brainpower to analyse it and use it properly. Especially when you are looking for the terrorist needle in a haystack. Over-classification is a key issue in the fight against fast evolving terrorist organisations.

Another perspective can be found over at Secrecy News – “DoD Inspector General Report on Over-classification misses the mark“.

More about the USA Department of Defense Inspector General

Alex Webling was the head of protective security in the Australian Attorney-General’s Department.

Hacking the spies – or how to counter the cyber insurgency

You may have seen some fairly alarmist reporting from the ABC about Chinese interests hacking ASIO, Australia’s version of the FBI.

Information Dominos 1

 

New espionage?

For those who haven’t seen it. The allegations come from the Four Corners program and relate to compromises of sub-contractors of ASIO. ASIO is building a huge new central office and it seems that the Chinese managed to get the blueprints for the building. ASIO is a hard nut for a foreign intelligence agency to attack, so the way to get there is to use their contractors.

The point is that this is not any different from what would have occurred during the cold war! The Chinese or Russians for that matter would have previously used their human intelligence networks. It seems likely that this information would have been a target 50 years ago just as much as now.

Information Dominos 2

What is different then?

The difference is the sheer quantity of attacks that are occurring. We have moved from the Cold War, where the superpowers fought their battles in small third countries such as in South America, Africa or the Middle East to the new paradigm – the cyber insurgency. The wars between the superpowers have moved onshore to the malls and industrial parks of our cities and then they disappear. The authorities and companies are never quite sure who to trust and when / where the insurgent hackers will reappear.

The guerrilla must swim in the people as the fish swims in the sea.” –Aphorism based on the writing of Mao Zedong

Previously foreign intelligence agencies needed to identify targets and then find resources to compromise them. The new method is to attack anything that might be interesting and suck up whatever comes back. Spies no longer have the difficulty to get the information, they have the challenge to find the needles in the haystack. And they don’t differentiate between business and government. According to reports in the New York Times and a detailed report by Mandiant, any organisation that doesn’t protect its information security, whether private or public is potentially compromised.

4d

How can my organisation protect itself?

Paraphrasing the principles of counter-insurgency as espoused by David Galula and Robert Thompson

– the aim of the war is to gain the support of the population rather than control of territory

– most of the population will be neutral in the conflict.

– support of the population may be lost. The population must be efficiently protected to allow it to cooperate without fear of retribution

– in the guerilla phase of an insurgency, a government must secure its base areas first

Using these principles we can identify a strategic direction

The way to deal with an insurgency is through hearts and minds.Information Dominos 6

Organisations, whether government agencies or business need to share information with their public and other organisations. Only in this way can they create defence in-depth and help them protect themselves. The attacks on ASIO demonstrate that an organisations’ security is only as good as the weakest link. Importantly, the perimeters of risk in any organisation do not stop at the front door- if they ever did. Organisations suffer from hubris if they believe otherwise. This is why the concepts of deperimeterisation as espoused by the Jericho Foundation and others are so useful.

Organisations need to work out what they need to protect and set about protecting that. Declassification, although counter-intuitive is one way that can help organisations work out what information is valuable.

Organisations need to be adaptable and willing to work with the fact that most information will become available to their adversaries. They need to take advantage of the information in the intervening time.

By making information security central to their organisational decision process, organisations can become more adaptable to this evolving threat. This means moving the security officer from the corner office to the top-level of the organisation. In turn, the security officer needs to change his/her attitude from the ‘computer says no’ person, to the one who says, yes, this is the best way we can do it to make the organisation’s aims with tolerable risk.

Such an organisation is indeed resilient.  Change needs to come in the leadership of government and organisations to deal with it. I’m not sure they understand how big this challenge will be.

Information, if you don't protect it, it just fades away
Information, if you don’t protect it, it just fades away

 

Back To Top

 

Online trusted identities – a primer

“Trust is the currency of the new economy”

You may have heard recently about the efforts being promoted by the USA and Australia amongst others to promote trusted online identities. There are also significant efforts in the private sector to develop online trust systems.

Trust will be the currency of the new economy as it was in the mediaeval village. During the late 19th and early 20th Century, formal identity credentials gradually replaced more informal systems of identifying people that we interacted with. Increasing population and technology drove this change. It was simply impossible to know everybody that you might deal with and so societies began to rely on commonly used credentials such as drivers’ licences to prove identity and ‘place’ in society. Of course, drivers’ licences don’t say much if anything about reputation. But if you think about  high value financial transactions you establish your identity and then you give a mechanism to pay for the transaction. Although in most cases it wouldn’t matter who you are, it gives the vendor some comfort that the name on your driver’s licence is the same as on your credit card and makes it just that bit more difficult to commit fraud on the vendor if the credit card isn’t legit. However this isn’t the case with interbank lending. Most of this is done on a trust basis within the ‘club’ of banks and it is only at a later time that the financials are tallied up for the day.

You can’t trust who or what is on the other end of the keyboard just because of what they say

What is a trusted ID?

Most simply, trusted online identity systems are the online equivalent of a physical credential such as a drivers’ licence used to give evidence of identity online. They can (but don’t have to) also be the basis for online reputation. They may also say something about the rights of the credential holder, such as that they are a resident in a particular country.

Which countries are developing trusted identity systems

The program in the USA is called NSTIC – National Strategy for Trusted Identities in Cyberspace. In Australia, the Prime Ministers’ department has been investigating the possibility of a trusted identity system as part of its work on a cyber policy paper which was due to be released ‘early in 2012’. At the same time, Australia has undertaken a number of processes of service delivery reform, government 2.0 and e-health. All without necessarily solving the problem of identifying whom they are dealing with online. The USA has gone beyond the planning stage and announced that it will move forward on development. As I mentioned recently. NIST has announced grants for pilot projects in NSTIC.

Some countries have already implemented online identity systems simply by migrating their physical identity cards online and allowing these to be used as trusted online systems. A number of Asian countries including Malaysia, Hong Kong and Singapore have proportions of their online services available through such means. Estonia probably leads the world in online service delivery with around 90% of the population having access to an online ID card and around 98% of banking transactions being via the Internet. More information at the Estonia EU website. While NSTIC was issued by the USA government, it calls for the private sector to lead the development of an Identity Ecosystem that can replace passwords, allow people to prove online that they are who they claim to be, and enhance privacy.  A tall order which runs the risk of creating an oligopoly of identity systems driven by corporate interests and not one which suits users. It may be a signal of things to come that Citibank and Paypal have recently been accepted to lead development of the NSTIC. There are also a number of private sector initiatives which come at the issue from a different perspective. Beyond Paypal, Google Wallet and the recently announced Apple Passbook are interesting initiatives which give some of the attributes of a trusted identity.

Why might we want one?

As more services go online from both government and business and more people want to use them there will be an increased demand for a way of proving who you are online without having to repeat the process separately with each service provider. In some ways this is already happening when we use PayPal to buy products not only on eBay, where it originated but also on Wiggle.co.uk and many others. The problem is that different services need different levels of trust between the vendor and the purchaser. Thinking about a transaction in terms of risk… The majority of private sector transactions online carry equal risk for both the vendor and customer. In that the customer risks that he or she won’t get a product or service from the transaction and the vendor risks that they won’t get the cash. Here online escrow services such as Transpact, or PayPal can help.

Where this doesn’t work well is where there complexity to the transaction.  The banking or government services sector are key areas where this is the case. Here the vendor must know their customer. One area might be analysing whether a customer can pay for a service on credit. Another is in applying for a passport, you need to prove that you are a citizen and pay a fee. However, the intrinsic value of the passport is far greater than the face value, as shown by the black market price. The result to the government if it issues the passport to the wrong person is not the value of the nominal fee, but closer to the black market value of the passport.

As a result, we are at an impasse online, in order for more ‘high trust’ services to go online the community has to have more trust that people are who they say they are.

Who might need a trusted identity?

If you take the Estonian example, 90% of the population. Most of us carry around some form of identity on our persons that we can present if required. In some countries, it’s the law that a citizen must carry their identity card around with them. In Australia and Canada and other countries, it’s a bit more relaxed. In the end the question will be whether a trusted id is used by customers and required by vendors. This will be influenced by whether there are alternative ways of conveying trust between people and institutions which are independent of the concept of identity in the traditional sense of the word

Next time:

What are the security and safety implications of a trusted identity and a discussion of about social footprint and whether this may overtake government efforts

 

Why the world needs the cyber equivalent of an international law of the sea

Islands of order in a sea of chaos

I’ve been thinking for the best part of the last decade about Internet governance and its impact on national security. In that time, little has changed to improve security for users.

The Internet as we know it today can be compared in many ways to the high seas during the swashbuckling so-called Golden age of Piracy between around 1650 and 1730 when pirates ruled the Caribbean.

Why is this comparison valid? Because in the Internet today, like on the high seas of yesteryear, there are islands of order surrounded by seas of chaos. The islands of order are the corporate networks like Facebook, Google, Amazon, Ebay etc and those run by competent governments for their citizens. However, between these orderly Internet islands are large areas where there are no rules and where pirates and vagabonds thrive. An additional similarity is that some of the most competent and successful historical pirates operated with the explicit support from countries seeking to further their national aims.

Even those who govern the orderly Internet islands are subject to bold attacks from chaos agents if they are not vigilant! Witness the compromise of Linkedin earlier this year and very few governments have not had some significant compromise affect their operations.

On the high seas, piracy has been reduced significantly since the 18th Century. With the exception of places like the coast of Somalia, there are now far fewer places where there is a significant piracy problem.  There are a number of reasons why this has been a success. Not least of these has been the development of law of the high seas.

In cyberspace, the world also needs to be moving on from the swashbuckling days. Internet criminals need to be hunted down in whichever corner of the Internet they lurk. Additionally, the concept that some countries could give free reign to local cyber-criminals, as long as they don’t terrorise their own countrymen/women, is an anathema in the 21st Century.

The long term solution has remained in my view a cyber version of the  UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. UCLOS is the international agreement, most recently updated in 1982 that governs behaviour by ships in international waters. Apart from other things the convention deals with acts of piracy committed in international waters.

In the same way, a similar international cybercrime convention could deal with acts where the victim was from for example the USA, the criminal from the Vatican and the offence committed on a server in South Korea.

It would seem that at the moment any move towards a UN convention has gone off the boil. A proposal was shot down in 2010 over disagreements around national sovereignty and human rights. As well, the European Union and USA  position was that a new treaty on cyber crime was not needed since the Council of Europe Convention on Cyber Crime had already been in place for 10 years and has been signed or ratified by 46 countries since  2001.

As I recently noted, wariness by both USA and China continues and means that any international agreement which includes Western countries and the BRICs will be a long time coming. China, Russia and other countries submitted a Document of International Code of Conduct for Information Security to the United Nations in 2011 which the USA seems to have dismissed out of hand.

A code of conduct is nice and the Council of Europe convention is a good start, but they need to be supported by some sort of international cyber ‘muscle’ in the long term.

However, all is not lost. In the meantime, working to coordinate the orderly organisations’ defences that I wrote about before, is a practical step that organisations and governments should be doing more of. This is the cyber equivalent of escorting ships through dangerous waters and passing them from one island of order to another.

There’s a good reason for this, and here’s the resilience message. The cyber-security of an organisation does not begin and end at their firewall or outer perimeter. Whilst in most cases an organisation cannot force other organisations to which it is connected to change, it can maintain vigilance over areas outside its direct sphere of control. This then allows the organisation more time to adapt to its changing environment and of course, a chain is only a strong as its weakest link.

The other step to be taken is to help emerging nations and organisations with poor online security to improve their cyber-defences. If the first step was like escorting ships between the orderly islands, this second step is the equivalent of helping nearby islands to improve their battlements so that the pirates don’t take over and then attack us! This work has been going on for some time. I chaired a number of seminars on cyber security and the need for computer emergency response teams for the APEC telecommunication and information working group which began this work in 2003 and this has been carried on by a number of countries around the world in fits and starts, but we need more.

Alex

“It is not the strongest of the species that survives, nor the most intelligent that survives. It is the one that is most adaptable to change”

The quote above has been often misattributed to Charles Darwin. But according to the Darwin project, it is actually a quote from Leon Megginson* in the 1960s paraphrasing Darwin in a management journal.

Now that I have done my bit to put that meme to bed, it is worth considering whether there is value in the concept or whether it is a dangerous oversimplification. And the answer is…

.. It depends!

You didn’t really think there was a black or white answer to this. The facts, such as we have, are that there are very few companies around today which are in the same form. Indeed, Mark Perry’s in his excellent economics blog Carpe Diem presents a chilling picture comparing the US fortune 500 from 1955 and 2011.

Of the 500 companies on the list in 1955, fewer than one in seven are still on the list in 2012! Only 57 years later. I say only 57 years, because it is less than the lifespan of an average western person.

So what happened to the rest, the other 6 in 7? They have either gone bankrupt, been privatised, merged, or their fortunes have gone south to the point that they are under the Fortune 500.

The parallels between evolution and raw capitalism are hard to resist. Indeed, although this may be a bridge too far, there may even be a parallel between evolutionary eras such as the Cambrian Explosion and the current communications technology fuelled business environment. As such, the life expectancy of companies seems to be getting less as the speed of global communications increases.  Steve Jobs is quoted in Forbes Magazine suggesting “why decline happens” at great companies: “The company does a great job, innovates and becomes a monopoly or close to it in some field, and then the quality of the product becomes less important. The company starts valuing the great salesman, because they’re the ones who can move the needle on revenues.” So salesmen are put in charge, and product engineers and designers feel demoted: Their efforts are no longer at the white-hot center of the company’s daily life. They “turn off.”

Maybe another way to say this is that all organisations must have purpose, whether that is a government agency or a company. The widgets (for want of a better description) might be policy or law in the case of a government agency; cars in the case of a car company; or services in the case of a services organisation. If the organisation maintains its focus on why it exists, then it can maybe adapt and survive beyond the average – however, this is hard work and most will end up like trilobites, ubiquitous one day, fossils the next.

Alex

Trilobite fossil – Photo by kevinzim – http://www.flickr.com/photos/[email protected]/43243889/

*Megginson, L. C. (1964). “Key to Competition is Management.” Petroleum Management, 36(1): 91-95.