That’s why Alex Webling has accepted a nomination to join the Australian Standards Committee for Security Standards and to join the Australian Delegation to ISO TC292, Morioka, Japan in March 2015.
We congratulate Alex on this recognition of his security knowledge and expertise particularly in the areas of enterprise security and resilience and his work in the Australasian Council of Security Professionals and its successor, Security Professionals Australasia.
The Technical Committee will have the following provisional title and scope:
Scope: Standardization in the field of security, including but not limited to generate security management, business continuity management, resilience and emergency management, fraud countermeasures and controls, security services, homeland security.
Excluded: Sector specific security projects developed in other relevant ISO committees and standards developed in ISO/TC 262 and ISO/PC 278.
The committee temporary structure covers the following areas;
ISO/TC 223/WG 1 – Framework standard on societal security management
ISO/TC 223/WG 2 – Terminology
ISO/TC 223/WG 3 – Emergency management
ISO/TC 223/WG 4 – Resilience and continuity
ISO/TC 223/WG 6 – Mass evacuation
ISO/TC 223/AHG – Professional development
ISO/TC 223/AHG – Information exchange
ISO/TC 223/AHG – Continuity management
ISO/TC 223/AHG – Revision of ISO 22320
ISO/TC 223 TF – Task force on strategic dialogue
ISO/TC 223/AHG 4 – Communication group
ISO/TC 223 DCCG, Developing countries contact group
ISO/TC 247/WG 1 – MSS for security assurance
ISO/TC 247/WG 2 – Terminology
ISO/TC 247/WG 3 – Guidelines for interoperable object and related authentication systems to deter
counterfeiting and illicit trade
ISO/TC 247/WG 4 – Product Fraud Countermeasures and Controls
ISO/TC 247/WG 5 – Document Fraud Countermeasures and Controls
ISO/PC 284/WG 1 – Management system for private security operations – Requirements with guidance
State of ICT Security – Attackers take over SCADA controlled steelworks furnace and caused massive damage
The threat to online assets from attackers remains critical according to a report just released on the State of ICT security by the German Government.
Cloud Computing, mobile systems and big data are providing enormous economic prosperity, but have on the other hand opened up large attack surface for organisations.
The German Federal Department for Safety in Information Technology has just released its annual “State of ICT Security” report for 2014. The German Government’s version of the bit of NSA that helps government and businesses protect themselves online is called the BSI. They are highly skilled and well respected.
As is usual for a government report it is turgid. However there is some really interesting stuff hidden in the morass. I’ve picked out some of the gems and translated them here.
Complexity is killing information security
The report emphasises that complexity is exposing organisations to attack. Of particular concern is that Internet of Things (Systeme und Dinge) is now moving from the stage where it is mostly about observation of the environment to changing the environment.
Importantly, particularly in light of the Snowden expose, this report is not coming from either the US or UK and so gives a secondary source to some of what those governments are saying.
There are over 250 million individual varieties of Windows malware around now
Other observations which confirm what you may have seen in other places
Spam continues to grow exponentially
Malware is still growing and at least a million devices are being infected annually in Germany. The BSI estimates that the number of different types of Windows malware is at a staggering 250 million. This is up from around 180 million in 2013!
The number of infected sites delivering ‘driveby exploits’ is growing substantially.
Botnets are being used to steal identity information. There are more than one million devices under the control of botnets in Germany.
Phishing continues to yield results for cyber criminals
Advanced Persistent Threats – an increasing threat for government and industry
Germany is constantly being cyber-attacked by foreign intelligence services. The BSI has installed improved sensor technology in the government’s networks following the revelations that came from Edward Snowden in 2013/14. There are a number of methodologies which the BSI has identified. This tallies quite well with some of the things Bruce Schneier has written recently about these issues
Strategic enlightenment – whereby the intelligence service identifies connections between various users to gain an intelligence picture
Attacks on key individuals – attacking system administrators for key systems to gain access.
Influencing Standards – By weakening standards, , the allegation has been that NSA individuals have influenced the NIST standards development process.
Manipulation of IT hardware and software – Well they would do that wouldn’t they.
The BSI notes that trusted insiders are being used to enable some attacks by intelligence services, criminals and activists.
This table is reasonably easy to read, even if you don’t understand German. It shows the prognosis (prognose) for threats over the coming year.
Schwachstellen = vulnerabilities
Schadprogramme = malware
Identitaetsdiebstahl = ID theft
The report goes through a number of cases where the BSI was called to assist businesses. Here are two that are of particular concern.
Steelworks compromise causes massive damage to furnace.
One of the most concerning was a targeted APT attack on a German steelworks which ended in the attackers gaining access to the business systems and through them to the production network (including SCADA). The effect was that the attackers gained control of a steel furnace and this caused massive damages to the plant.
Dragonfly attacks a dozen companies
The Dragonfly hacker group attacked a number of companies’ SCADA systems and installed the malware ‘Havex’. This was used to gather information about the systems. No damage was done, because the compromise was detected and removed before the hackers had completed the observation and intelligence gathering phase.
It’s worth remembering that there are many other countries dealing with the cyber threat around the world. Germany has always been one of the leading non-UK CAN, US, AUS, NZ countries and it is interesting to see how they view the landscape.
The siege in a chocolate shop in Sydney’s CBD ended early this morning AEST. Three people died, including one purported to be the gunman Haron Monis.
There will necessarily be intense scrutiny on the forces used to resolve a violent event. However, it is important to remember that they do not happen in isolation.
The factors that lead us to these events are always complex and often have geo-political, sociological and psychological underpinnings. In this case, the gunman, was a convicted criminal and seems to have latched on to the idea of violent jihad to justify his own failings.
This is the time for cool heads. It is far more effective and efficient to invest in efforts which counter radicalism before it descends into violence. To that end, we should remember the quiet work of those who enfranchise the disenfranchised and seek to strengthen social cohesion.
It is these people, who make our way of life so great.
Governments at all levels must lead in these efforts. Politicians must remember, whatever their political colour, that radicalism is a complex societal issue, not a sound bite. Else we descend into barbarism.
As a society, we must remember that the work of all members of the civil society needs to be focussed on countering radicalism.
This event received so much coverage precisely because it is uncommon in Australia
Just remember that the reason this event received so much coverage in the media is precisely because it is so rare. And of course, it was across the road from the HQ of one of the big Australian TV channels.
Yet, at the same time across the world, six people died, one was wounded, and the gunman escaped in a shooting in Philadelphia. In that case, it seems that the gunman is a mentally disturbed ex soldier.
Yet, although it was reported, multiple shootings are depressingly common in the US. They are even more common in parts of Africa, and often the reports don’t even make it beyond the local news.
It all comes back to risk and societal resilience, because when citizens are allowed to panic, governments start using extreme measures in our names. Professionalism in risk and security is about understanding the difference between perception and reality and taking an evidence based approach to dealing with the issues.
The IAPP announced at the 2014 IAPP Privacy Summit “Privacy at Play” held at the Westin on 17 November in Sydney that Alex Webling had won the 2014 award for best article published in the association’s journal “Privacy Unbound”.
The iappANZ is the pre-eminent forum for privacy professionals in Australia and New Zealand. We are affiliated with the International Association of Privacy Professionals (IAPP) which is the largest privacy body at the global level with a membership approaching 20,000. We work with public and private entities across all industry sectors in Australia and New Zealand as well as the Privacy Commissioners in both countries.
The iappANZ Privacy Unbound Journal provides practical thought leadership and case studies along with a popular Q&A with the Australian and New Zealand Privacy Commissioners to keep members in touch with regulators. iappANZ also provides a Weekly and Daily Digest for regular privacy news updates.
In this part, we talk about some approaches to the trusted insider problem.
Organisations are asking “How can we stop employees becoming the next Edward Snowden?”
I think we should question is why aren’t there more people like Edward Snowden? I think it is worth noting that the NSA is huge with an unconfirmed staff count in the order of 30,000-40,000. One or even ten ‘rogue insiders’ is as a percentage very small – even though the damage to the USA and its allies has been very significant.
Organisations, including intelligence organisations, develop very rigorous and reliable procedures to ensure that people who shouldn’t be trusted don’t join their organisations. Good recruitment practices which exclude people who won’t fit and don’t let people become insiders in the first place are the best defence. However, one of the hardest issues to manage is to deal with people who gradually become disgruntled after they’ve been working in an organisation for a while.
Of course, organisations can use infosec procedures such as internal surveillance mechanisms and information compartmentalisation. These can reduce the consequences wrought by trusted insiders. However these mechanisms can inhibit the rest of the employee body from working at their full potential. It also can affect staff morale if not carefully marketed. Interestingly SIG attendees were told that the Attorney-General’s Department was considering the possibility of a continuous disclosure regime for security clearances which would in real or near real time provide information to security officials about whether employees were undertaking activities which might raise eyebrows.
A Sharing economy model?
Considering an organisational ‘sharing economy’ model when considering the trusted insider threat might help. The employee/employer relationship is one of mutual benefit. It can be also one of mutual harm.
Employees work for their organisation and their identity becomes entwined in the reputation and identity of that organisation. As mentioned previously, the trusted insider that does the wrong thing by their organisation does so for a number of reasons. The most dangerous reason has always been those who are motivated not by money or greed, but by a grievance or revenge.
If we extrapolate using the NSA/Snowden example…. The NSA has built up an impressive reputation over many years for technical excellence. But maybe some of its employees believed the propaganda of their employer. More importantly, it would seem that NSA’s management failed to completely disabuse their employees of the fact that intelligence agencies live in a grey world and do things that are morally grey. Consequently people working inside the NSA seem to have been surprised when they found that some of the things it was doing were dark. Unfortunately for the NSA, brilliant people became disillusioned and turned against it.
This explanation is probably not the whole answer. However a couple of thoughts arise both of which may help to prevent future events:
is it possible to develop an internal organisational market for the reputation of the organisation?
A meaningful alternative chain of reporting to vent frustrations is vital.
A market of organisational reputation
Many private and public organisations organisations spend significant sums to monitor their public relations posture. There is benefit in understanding what the organisation thinks about itself as well. An anonymous reporting mechanism can allow an organisation to get some information about whether it is ‘on the nose’. Such data might also be combined with metrics such as the number of relevant social media postings.
An alternative chain of reporting
Both USA and Australia now have whistle-blower mechanisms for their intelligence services. In Australia, the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security performs this role.
Many organisations both in the private and public sector could consider the benefits of taking on aspects of this system. It obviously doesn’t work perfectly, but it certainly contributes to the protection of the intelligence agencies from trusted insiders.
Mr Snowden has claimedthat “he had raised alarms at multiple levels about the NSA’s broad collection of phone, email and Internet connections.” However, this is disputed by the USA. Whatever the truth of the matter, it seems that Snowden felt he wasn’t being listened to. So maybe the take-home from this aspect is that the ‘alternate chain’ of reporting needs to have big teeth to make changes where there are real problems identified. Balancing natural justice against the consequences of a breach is incredibly important. Not only for the individual concerned, but for the organisation itself, because you know people in organisations gossip about each other!
This is of course a governance issue, and this makes it very tricky to get right – this is where Resilience Outcomes Australia can help your organisation, because resilience and longevity of organisations is what we do.
Helping organisations protect themselves against trusted insiders
I attended the Security in Government (SIG) conference in Canberra earlier this month. I am somewhat biased, but I think that SIG is probably the best annual security related gathering in Australia.
If you compare it to a lot of international gatherings SIG certainly holds its own. Although, the US and German conferences in particular have glitz and size, the quality of the discussion and the more intimate nature is refreshing. SIG, as you may have guessed is primarily targeted at government, but there are good lessons for all organisations to be had there. Ok, enough of the fanboy …
The 2014 SIG theme was the ‘trusted insider’. Whilst the discussions were often very good, I wondered whether there are additional approaches to reducing the problem of the trusted insider. These approaches focus more on the relationship between employees and their organisations.
Who are the trusted insiders?
A trusted insider is somebody who uses their privileged access to cause harm to their employer or their interests. I’ll be a bit controversial here and note that, whether these people are traitors, spies or whistle-blowers depends somewhat on perspective. In any case these people evoke strong almost visceral emotions in many people.
Why are organisations so concerned about the trusted insider?
Despite fears about rogue hackers attacking organisations from the outside, the trusted insider is still considered the biggest threat to an organisation. In Australia and overseas, trusted insiders ‘going rogue’ have caused the significant damage to national security, government agencies and private organisations. The harm done can be from loss of secrets, money or even life.
Secrets: The most glaring examples in the information security space have probably come out of the USA in recent times. People like Edward Snowden and Chelsea (Bradley) Manning spring to mind in the national security sphere. However, some Swiss banks have also been stung by Bradley Birkenfield whom some in those establishments might call a trusted insider and the US tax agency would call a whistle-blower!
Money: Fraud is probably the most significant threat to private organisations from trusted insiders, particularly those in the finance and insurance industry. Sometimes the size of an event can be enormous, such as when $2billion was lost in 2011 through ‘unauthorised transactions’ in a Swiss bank.
Life and property: Whilst we often focus on loss of information confidentiality, trusted insiders were also responsible for assassinating the Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi in the 1980s and shooting fellow soldiers in the USA and Afghanistan in the last decade. There have also been a number of cases of ‘issue motivated’ insiders harming organisations by damaging plant and equipment.
What motivates the trusted insider? C.R.I.M.E.S.
The motivations of trusted insiders are varied, however they broadly fit under the standard drivers of criminal behaviour as described by the mnemonic ‘crimes’.
Coercion – being forced, blackmailed or intimated
Revenge – for a real or perceived wrong, it could be about disaffection and or a grudge
Ideology – radicalisation or advancement of an ideology /religious objective
Money – for cash, profit, dosh, moolah – whatever you call it, and/or
Exhilaration or Ego– for the excitement or because they think that they are in someway cleverer than their compatriots – Christopher Cook seemed driven by the excitement..
The USA’s “worst intelligence disaster” was Robert Hanssen, who might be described as an egomaniac.
Sex and personal relationships. The combination of sex and coercion is a lethal one.
Of course, some are also mentally fragile and may not have a motivation that is exactly clear to others.
End of part 1
In the coming part, we talk about some approaches to the trusted insider problem.
The best indicators of the future are the events of the past, yet the past is not an absolute indicator or future events. Outlier events are becoming more common and threatening the existence of organisations – Is enterprise risk management to be thrown out?
The vast majority of organisations that have ever existed are not around today. Of the top 25 companies on the US Fortune 500 in 1961, only six remained there in 2011.
The few that survive broadly did so for two reasons, which Alex Webling, Treasurer of the Australasian Council of Security Professionals will discuss with examples at ASIS Asia Pacific 2014 in Singapore.
I think we all understand that small businesses come and go, but this lesson is true for large organisations as well.Research carried out on fortune 500 companies in the USA showed that the average rate of turnover of large organisations is accelerating. The turnover has reduced from around 35 years in 1965 to around 15 years in 1995.
Alex has talked about this topic before and will be expanding on his observations and research with conference participants about how they might assist their organisational longevity.
Is it possible to enhance privacy with social login?
The likelihood that any Australian Government is going to create an online identity credential now seems distant with the National Trusted Identities Framework (NTIF) almost forgotten. How quickly the Internet forgets, but maybe that’s a good thing if you’re Mario Costeja González.
But the need that the NTIF sought to fill has not gone away. Governments are trying to work out how to service their citizen/customer/users at lower cost. The Internet offers one possibility, but in taking their services online, government agencies expose themselves and us to different threats and potentially higher risk. However, it seems inevitable that government agencies will follow financial institutions in offering higher value transactions online. In the end, the economic argument is likely to drive government agency migration online with more high trust services. Recent federal and state/territory budget announcements are only likely to spur this movement.
There are a number of threats that need to be mitigated before a government agency could potentially provide its services online. Probably the key issue is for the agency to be sure that a user requesting access to a site is who they say they are. Currently issuing the customer with a username and password mostly does this, but the model is beginning to fail. The problem is that most people don’t interact with government agencies on a regular basis and yet information sensitivity and computer capabilities require users to adopt increasingly complex and non-sensical passwords.
This in turn makes the passwords more difficult to remember even as they are harder to crack. It also means that password resets are much demanded. Yet at the same time, customers are expected to change their passwords regularly, not to write them down or repeat them for other online services.
It seems clear that these password requirements largely force customers to break their user agreements and either, write their passwords down, or worse re-use them for other services/websites.
It also puts government agencies in a bind. They want to provide online access to their services because it could be cheaper to operate than bricks and mortar outlets (if they didn’t have to reset too many passwords), but they also do not want to be embarrassed by privacy and security breaches.
One option is the use of a social login to help secure online authentication. This could enhance user information security and minimise privacy breaches. Social login, also known as social sign-in, is a form of simple sign-on (to web resources) using existing membership of a social networking service such as Facebook, Yahoo, Twitter or Google+ to sign into a third party website in lieu of creating a new login account specifically for that website or service. Social login is designed to simplify logins for end users as well as provide more and more reliable demographic information to website owners. Social login can be used as a mechanism for both identity authentication and user authorisation.
Social login is being adopted by private sector organisations for a number of reasons including: Rapid registration; Verified email contacts; and Customer stickiness. However social login also offers three major benefits for government agencies.
– Currency of contact data. Contact data such as email tend to be kept up to date by the user.
– Passwords are less easily forgotten because they are regularly used. At the same time, the social login passwords are not transmitted from the user to the agency website.
– Security. Agencies can leverage security technologies implemented by the social networks that they might never be able to replicate themselves. Because of their resources, social networks such as Google and Facebook are able to detect and patch zero day exploits quickly.
So what are the privacy risks?
A user, when accepting the convenience of a social login, can share a significant amount of their information between a third party website (such as a government agency) and the social network. The social site is informed of every social login performed by the user. Often, it is worth considering whether users understand exactly what they are sharing and whether they are giving informed consent to share. However this risk can be mitigated with the creation of clear and detailed login screens, which explain what the users are sharing.
As an example, the following information is returned when a Facebook user agrees to share their ‘Basic Profile’. Other than the email, the information is not verified and may not be present. However, several organisations claim that the quality of the data returned is in general very good because social network users feel social pressure from their friends to be accurate.
At the same time, it is not necessary for the third party website to collect all the information if it is not required.
Another issue surrounds current sensitivities with the USA NSA’s indiscriminate hoovering of online data. It is important to note that because all the large social networking sites are based in the USA, they are subject to USA’s laws and customs related to security and privacy. Under that regime, Australians are given significantly fewer protections than USA citizens or residents. Effectively, the social networking site itself provides the main protection for reputational reasons. However, readers may be aware that there have been recent moves in the USA to change this approach for what the US charmingly calls ‘aliens’ like Australians and give the same protections for all users irrespective of citizenship.
Can we get the benefits of social login and have citizen privacy as well?
With careful design it seems possible that social login could enhance privacy for users at the same time as providing benefits to government agencies. Considering the social login as an adjunct to agency authentication rather than the whole process could be an answer. If customers nominate their social login at the same time as they were enrolled into a government service, they could later use their social login as the first stage of an authentication process. This would provide an outer layer of defence against hacking. The user could then login to the agency itself using a separate authentication process.
The advantages of this model, beyond defence in depth, are that the user logs into the agency with their authenticated social login username, but does not gain access to sensitive information without providing an agency specific authentication. The social network also does not receive any sensitive information beyond the fact that a user logged in at a website. The use of government portals can be used to obfuscate which agency a user is accessing. At the same time, with consent, contact information from the social login site could be compared with that held by the agency and presented to users so that they can choose to update the information held on them by the agency.
At both the state and federal level, government agencies are starting to actively consider social login. Provided that governments are also prepared to carefully design the user interaction so that the social networks don’t get any more personal information than the user/citizen is prepared to share – by turning off analytics and sharing social network authentication gateways across groups of government agencies, it can provide benefit to users and government alike.
In the longer term, government will be able to verify citizens online when they wish to enrol themselves for services. The possibility arises to use the Document Verification Service (DVS) combined with social history to connect an entity to an identity, but that may be a discussion for another time.
I’d love to hear what you think.
This article originally appeared under the title “Can social login be privacy enhancing” in the May 2014 edition of Privacy Unbound, the journal of the International association of privacy professionals (IAPP) Australia New Zealand chapter and can be found here at this link iappANZ_MayJournal
Resilience for organisations is bound to their adaptability to climate change both in the short and long term.
A review of US public companies shows a number of climate related risks and costs. Their ability to adapt and become resilient to climate change is starting to affect their finances.
The document reveals that USA S&P 500 companies are seeing climate change related risks increase in urgency, likelihood and frequency, with many describing significant impacts already affecting their business operations, according to a new report from CDP, which collects environmental performance information on behalf of investors.
Threats include damage to facilities, reduced product demand, lost productivity and necessitated write-offs. The impact of these threats being realised comes with costs that can reach millions of dollars.
Importantly, the proximity of the threat is quite near. 45% of the risks S&P 500 companies face from extreme weather and climate changes are current, or expected to fall within the next one-to-five years, up from 26% just three years ago. 50% of these risks range from “more likely than not” to “virtually certain”. This is up from 34% three years ago.
Around 60 companies describe the current and potential future risks and their associated costs in the research, which highlights excerpts from the companies’ disclosures to their investors between 2011 and 2013. Ironically, even NewCorp made the following contribution to the report.
“Climate projection models make it difficult to know exactly how business might be impacted by episodic weather events. However, it is clear from past severe weather events that some of News Corporation’s businesses are susceptible to such extreme weather.”(p6)
The media release accompanying the report asserts that
Dealing with climate change is now a cost of doing business
Making investments in climate change related resilience planning both in their own operations and in the supply chain has become crucial for all corporations to manage this increasing risk.
Resilience Outcomes has the skills and expertise to help your organisation develop its organisational resilience strategy to take into account how it will adapt to the changing environment. contact us via the form below or at [email protected] to discuss your needs.
CDP is an international, not-for-profit organisation providing the only global system for companies and cities to measure, disclose, manage and share vital environmental information. We work with market forces to motivate companies to disclose their impacts on the environment and natural resources and take action to reduce them